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I. INTRODUCTION
The hostile takeover regulatory regime has evolved in response to proxy
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contests and tender offers.1 Due to a lack of federal interest, states (mainly
Delaware) have stepped in to provide rules of the game for this area of
corporate law.2 Delaware mainly focuses on fiduciary doctrines and standards
of review.3
The regulatory regime evolved to create a merger doctrine, which allows
Board of Directors (Boards) to fend off unwelcomed suitors by implementing
procedures that make takeover attempts costly; i.e., they were allowed to
deploy “poison pills.” 4 These pills have proven their ability to negatively
impact market participants by shielding inept and corrupt leaders in huge
companies like Enron, WorldCom, and Countrywide.5 The downfall of these
companies negatively affected stakeholders and resulted in significant
unemployment.6 The necessary solution is to repeal poison pill legislation.
In essence, the poison pill provides boards with too much control. Boards
can deny shareholders access to fair offers.7 They can also adopt poison pills
quickly without shareholder approval. 8 Boards have the ability to repel
acquirers by making the acquisition too costly. They use the poison pill to
dilute acquisition efforts and increase the time it takes to acquire a company by
replacing a board.9 As such, poison pill legislation should be replaced with
statutes that allow shareholders to entertain bids for their company's acquisition
without having the board of directors determine whether the shareholders can
review these offers.
Boards can also utilize the pill to increase costs by using it as a
bargaining tool to obtain excessive compensation packages.10 Although this


1

John Armour et al., The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in Developed and Emerging
Markets: An Analytical Framework, 52 HARV. INT'L L.J. 219, 239–40 (2011).
2
Id. at 241–42.
3
Id. at 241–46.
4
Id. Generally, a poison pill defense maneuver can consist of boards issuing stock rights to
all shareholders, except the hostile bidder, to purchase additional shares at 2-for-1 pricing, thus
diluting the raider’s capability. Id.
5
See KATALINA M. BIANCO, THE SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS: CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE
MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 6–15 (CCH 2008), http://business.cch.com/bankingfinance/focus/news/
Subprime_WP_rev.pdf; see also The 10 Worst Corporate Accounting Scandals of All Time,
ACCOUNTING-DEGREE.COM, http://www.accounting-degree.org/scandals/ (last visited Mar. 30,
2014).
6
BIANCO, supra note 5.
7
Sang Yop Kang, Transplanting a Poison Pill to Controlling Shareholder Regimes—Why It
Is So Difficult, 33 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 619, 622 (2013).
8
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 379 (Foundation Press 2d ed. 2009).
9
Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians
Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 858 (1993).
10
Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover
Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 908 (2002).
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move has enabled mergers to move forward by making hostile bids friendlier,11
it comes at a cost. 12 It also rewards bad performance connected with the
underperforming target.13
Digging deeper into the problem, the regulatory regime is tied to
politicians who craft underlying regulations.14 Politicians, burdened with an
interest in maintaining the power associated with their office, may favor the
interests of corporations that make huge political donations compared to the
general public, whose donations are far smaller. Politicians, as agents of the
general public, should owe shareholders a duty of loyalty.15 This could open
the door to shareholders being able to entertain fair offers without intrusive
board oversight.
Importantly, shareholders have the right to sell their shares.16 This right
should be protected,17 and directors should not be able to interfere with it.18 As
such, legislators should reconsider statutes authorizing poison pills and repeal
them.
This Note progresses as follows: Part II discusses how the hostile
takeover regime developed. This section provides a brief history, including a
hostile takeover overview and an explanation of Delaware fiduciary doctrines.
The section also provides a glimpse of the negative impact poison pills have on
market participants by describing the tension between key players and recent
adverse activity. Part III provides an analysis of poison pill ramifications and
why these shareholder rights plans should be repealed. It proceeds by arguing
that corporate boards have too much control. This section ties control to
executive compensation and the board’s ability to influence legislation through
political donations. Part III also provides a remedy related to statutory regimes
and shareholders’ right to vote. Finally, Part IV provides the conclusion that
poison pill legislation should be repealed because it typically limits shareholder
property rights by allowing company board of directors to decide whether the


11

See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill:
Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 899–900 (2002).
12
See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 6–7 (Harvard Univ. Press, 2004).
13
Id.
14
Robert G. Natelson, The Government as Fiduciary: A Practical Demonstration From the
Reign of Trajan, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 191, 211–32 (2001).
15
Id.
16
See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
407, 413–24 (2006).
17
Id. at 450.
18
Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605, 672
(2007).
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shareholders can vote to accept or deny offers for their shares. Legislatures
should adjust statutory regimes to respect shareholder’s ownership rights to the
extent that they are allowed to sell their shares without having boards as
gatekeepers.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Brief History of Hostile Takeovers and Related Regulations
The hostile takeover regulatory regime has evolved in response to
strategies utilized to acquire corporate control, mainly proxy contests and
tender offers. Where the federal government has left a gap, states have stepped
in to provide the regulatory guidance to assess takeover activities. 19 This
guidance is rooted in fiduciary duties and standards.20
1. Hostile Takeover Overview
Prior to 1960, the primary means for affecting a hostile takeover was the
proxy contest. 21 The proxy contest was mainly regulated by the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.22 State courts addressed lawsuits focused on unethical
behavior of target company boards.23 Beginning in the mid-1960s, the (cash)
tender offer was a preferred investment vehicle for acquiring a company. 24
Due to the abusive nature of this tactic, Congress passed the Williams Act of
1968, 25 which imposed important disclosure and procedure requirements for
tender offers.26 However, the Williams Act failed to regulate unethical target
board defenses.27 In response to the lack of interest of Congress, federal and
state agencies, and the Supreme Court, Delaware was thrust into the forefront
and began to develop the fundamental regime for this area of corporate law in


19

Armour et al., supra note 1, at 241–47.
Id.
21
Armour et al., supra note 1.
22
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78n (2010); Solicitation of
Proxies, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (2010).
23
Armour et al., supra note 1, at 240.
24
Id.
25
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, 455–56 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m–78n (2006)). Raiders made high-priced tender offers to
shareholders on a “first-come first-served” basis. See Armour et al., supra note 1, at 241–42. This
tactic intimidated shareholders into selling their shares. Id. The tactic also prevented target
company boards from defending against hostile attempts. Id.
26
Armour et al., supra note 1, at 241.
27
Id. at 241.
20
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1985. 28 It is within this framework that the laws regulating board conduct
originated and continues to evolve.29
2. New Delaware Fiduciary Doctrines
At this time, the federal government lacked interest in regulating board
responses to takeover measures.30 As Delaware was (and continues to be) the
primary state of incorporation for most public companies, it was forced to
develop rules to address unethical board responses to unwelcomed bids.31 In
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the Delaware Supreme Court decided
that a target board has the fiduciary duty and power to protect shareholders
from hostile bidders deemed to be a threat to company and shareholder
interests and to take measures proportionate to the threat.32
The Delaware Supreme Court also developed entirely new standards of
review, the “intermediate standards,” between 1985 and 1988.33 The Blasius
Industries v. Atlas Corp. (“Blasius”) standard requires that boards show
“compelling justification” for actions deemed intentional with regards to
interfering with shareholders’ right to vote for an alternative board. 34 The
Blasius court devised this standard to address the poison pill defense. 35 In
Moran v. Household International Inc., the court upheld the “pre-planned” use
of the poison pill.36 As a result, the poison pill became the favored defense
mechanism in the United States.37
B. Negative Impact on Market Participants
As with any process, the hostile takeover regulatory regime created


28

Id. at 241–42.
Id.
30
Id. The SEC also had little interest in regulating board tactics, such as the poison pill. Id.
Additionally, the Supreme Court “essentially sidelined federal judges and state legislatures with
respect to such corporate governance matters.” Id.
31
Id. at 241–42.
32
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985).
33
Armour et al., supra note 1, at 246.
34
Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 652 (Del. Ch. 1988). Blasius is still good law,
as it was recently cited in a current Delaware case. See Kallick v. Sandridge Energy, Inc., 68 A.3d
242, 258 (Del. Ch. 2013).
35
Armour et al., supra note 1, at 246.
36
Moran v. Household Int’l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985). The court noted that
“pre-planning for the contingency of a hostile takeover might reduce the risk that, under the
pressure of a takeover bid, management will fail to exercise reasonable judgment.” Id.
37
Armour et al., supra note 1, at 246.
29
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results as it evolved. This section will show some of the tensions that
developed during this regime’s early evolutionary period. This section will
then go a step further to help the reader understand this area of corporate law
by tying recent negative market results to it. The recent negative activity fuels
support to the idea that the current hostile takeover regulatory regime should be
repealed.
1. Tension Between the Raiders and the Business Roundtable
While the statutory regime developed, key players such as the corporate
raiders and the Business Roundtable took their positions on opposite sides.38
Raiders wanted to realize the underlying values of target companies, and
shareholders stood to gain because some of this value could have been
transferred to the shareholders.39 However, boards fought against this push by
utilizing groups like the Business Roundtable to lobby for big business.40 The
Business Roundtable lobbied Congress in the 1970s and 1980s, claiming that
acquisitions were acceptable. 41 However, Michael Milken came along and
forced some of these large corporations to succumb to his junk bond financing;
this was unacceptable. 42 According to the Roundtable, the big company
acquiring the little company was free enterprise; whereas, the little company
acquiring the big company was ‘un-American.’43 Even though the Roundtable
CEOs owned less than 1/300 of one percent of their companies’ outstanding
shares, they controlled the company assets, which were worth billions.44
Although lobbying at the federal level did not completely satisfy their
needs, the Roundtable and its allies continued to pursue their goals at the state


38

ROBERT SOBEL, DANGEROUS DREAMERS: THE FINANCIAL INNOVATORS FROM CHARLES
MERRILL TO MICHAEL MILKEN 147–48 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1993). The Business Roundtable
was a pro-big business lobbying group that served as a liaison between powerful CEOs and
Washington politicians who could help pass favorable legislation. Id. It was through the efforts of
the Secretary of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Chairman in 1972 that the Business
Roundtable came to existence with members from some of the country’s largest organizations. Id.
39
Id. at 121–35.
40
Id. at 147–48.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 62–63. Michael Milken is a Berkeley educated Wharton MBA. Id. Having
subscribed to the notion that low-rated, high-risk bonds could generate higher yields than their
counterparts, Michael Milken changed the finance industry by attracting investors to junk bonds.
Id. at 64–71. He subsequently generated revenue for known and unknown financiers who were
interested in acquiring control of corporations. Id. at 90–99.
43
Id. at 147–48.
44
SOBEL, supra note 38, at 147–48.
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level, where they realized much more success. 45 For instance, in 1987 the
Washington state legislature passed SB 608446 to protect the biggest company
in the state, Boeing, from one of Milken’s raiders – T. Boone Pickens. 47
Arizona also passed takeover legislation to protect the Greyhound Bus
Corporation from a perceived hostile threat.48 Similarly, Indiana passed the
Indiana Control Share Acquisition Statute to protect CTS Corporation from a
takeover by Dynamics Corporation of America.49 Massachusetts followed the
Indiana statute when it enacted legislation50 to protect Gillette from Revlon,
which was controlled by another Milken raider – Ronald Perelman. 51
Moreover, some twenty-one states passed legislation to protect their domiciled
companies from junk bond financing.52
2. Recent Negative Impact
Prior to poison pills, U.S. companies sat on unrealized value. This is
evidenced by the fact that pieces of companies were worth more than the whole
business enterprise, gains in the billions were reported on investments in the


45

Id. at 170–71.
Kathryn Wakefield, Just-in-Time Legislation: Do Corporation-Specific Statutes Violate
State Constitutional Prohibitions on Special Legislation?, 61 U. PITT L. REV. 843, 854 (2000)
(citing New Washington Takeover Law Aimed at Protecting Boeing from Pickens Raid, SEC. REG.
L. REP. (BNA), Aug. 14, 1987, at 1266). This bill stated that Boeing could not engage in any of
the significant business transactions with someone trying to acquire the company for five years
after that person acquired 10 percent or more of the target corporation's shares without the Board’s
approval. Id.
47
SOBEL, supra note 38, at 136–40. T. Boone Pickens is a renowned corporate raider, having
proven himself by running oil companies efficiently and making them profitable. Id. He was a
“David” amongst Goliaths when he recognized underperforming companies and sought to utilize
Milken’s war chest of money as a slingshot to take them down by acquiring them. Id.
48
Id. at 851 (citing Arizona Antitakeover Bill Signed During Special Session, SEC. REG. L.
REP. (BNA), July 31, 1987, at 1338). The law limited the voting rights of shares accumulated for a
hostile takeover, although the shares could be voted to elect directors or managers. Id.
49
Id. at 848. The Indiana Control Share Acquisition Statute prevented hostile acquirers from
exercising voting power without approval from a majority of the remaining shareholders. Burns
Ind. Code Ann. § 23-1-42-2. The Court upheld this statute in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987). Id.
50
Wakefield, supra note 46, at 851 (citing Massachusetts Adopts Broad Anti-Takeover Law,
19 SEC. REG. L. REP. 1099, (1987). The legislation stripped investors acquiring twenty percent or
more of a company of voting rights unless the non-management shareholders voted to reinstate
those rights. Id. See also Arthur R. Pinto, The Constitution and the Market for Corporate Control:
State Takeover Statutes After CTS Corp., 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 699, 714 (1988).
51
SOBEL, supra note 38, at 88. Ron Perelman is another Milken raider, made famous by his
acquisition of Revlon and wreaking havoc by, as virtually a no one, taking down large companies.
Id.
52
Id. at 170–71.
46
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millions, and investors were realizing huge returns of almost fifty percent.53 In
fact, Leveraged Buyout (LBO) investors realized average transactional gains of
about ninety-six percent.54
When companies sit on unrealized value, other negative consequences
can occur. For instance, income disparity can increase when company value is
underutilized because the few who control companies are better positioned to
exploit market weaknesses. 55 Large corporations are positioned to control
output and raise prices.56 Companies have the power to manufacture consumer
demands to the point where the public makes purchases that they do not need.57
Furthermore, corporate boards and officers become renegades, understanding
that they can pay shareholders relatively small amounts of appeasement money
while utilizing the lion’s share of profits for their own benefit.58 As such, these
profits have gone to the few at the expense of the many.59
Additionally, unemployment can occur when companies choose to
continue operating inefficiently, rather than subscribing to new ownership and
new ideas.60 Enron was born in 1985 when Houston Gas Company merged
with Internorth Inc. 61 While facing the possibility of bankruptcy during its
infancy, Enron fought off a hostile takeover attempt.62 Rather than succumbing
to raiders, the company chose to replace its CEO with Jeffrey Skilling.63 In the


53

Tony Ablum & Mary Beth Burgis, Leveraged Buyouts: The Ever Changing Landscape, 13
DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 109, 113–14 (2000).
54
See WILLIAM J. CARNEY, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 29–49 (Foundation Press 2nd ed.
2007). “LBO” translates to Leveraged Buyout. SOBEL, supra note 38, at 97. This is a way to
acquire a company by using its underlying value as equity for financing. Id.
55
John K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society, COMMENTARY (Aug. 1, 1958, 12:00 AM),
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/the-affluent-society-by-john-kenneth-galbraith/.
The few who control companies distract less fortunate consumers from moving to upper income
brackets by manufacturing wants along with the products to satisfy these wants. Id.
56
Daniel James, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, by Adolf A. Berle Jr. &
Gardiner C. Means, 8 IND. L.J. 8, 11 (1933) (Book Review), http://www.repository.law.indiana.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5120&context=ilj.
57
See generally Galbraith, supra note 55.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
See, e.g., Clinton Free, et al., Management Controls: The Organizational Fraud Triangle of
Leadership, Culture and Control in Enron, IVEY BUS. J. (July/Aug. 2007), http://
iveybusinessjournal.com/topics/the-organization/management-controls-the-organizational-fraudtriangle-of-leadership-culture-and-control-in-enron#.Unb5YflJMdU.
Enron’s
inefficient
operations consisted of operating outside of regulatory frameworks. Id. As a result, thousands lost
their jobs. Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. Jeffrey Skilling, as CEO, was instrumental in creating a corporate culture that enabled
the subversion of Enron’s management controls for preventing fraudulent practices. Id.
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end, Enron failed, over 4,000 employees lost their jobs and pensions, and
Skilling went to jail.64
WorldCom provides another example of a negative effect of the poison
pill. WorldCom renewed its poison pill during the spring of 2002. 65 The
company reported adopting the measure to protect shareholders from someone
shortchanging them by offering a low price for a WorldCom that was
extremely undervalued.66 Mind you, WorldCom’s stock appeared to be in a
free fall because, having traded for $64.50 about three years previously, it was
trading for less than $10.67 Stock price factors in to the market’s perception of
the effectiveness of company management in terms of maximizing value. 68
The drop in WorldCom’s stock price suggests that, comparatively, the market
did not sanction the business acumen of WorldCom’s leadership.69 As such,
the management team was busy re-deploying the poison pill while the market
probably preferred that WorldCom protect itself from its current leadership.
Generally, companies deploy poison pills to protect shareholder value.70
Poison pills work by making hostile attempts too expensive when acquirers
have to purchase additional shares to make up for the dilution the pill creates in
their existing shares. 71 However, who protects company shareholders from
management and boards that lack business acumen? Who will help the
shareholder avoid having to wait multiple years to replace leaders who do not
ensure that the company recognize and capitalize on necessary synergies?
Moreover, who will ensure the viability of the company, when current leaders
fail, in terms of its ability to generate finances necessary to procure resources
and efficiently cut costs needed for growth and value maximization?
Importantly, who protects the existing company from leaders who make up for
the lack of business acumen with fraud? The effects of fraud oftentimes extend
beyond the company to other stakeholders, including the general public.72


64

William W. Bratton, Does Corporate Law Protect the Interests of Shareholders and Other
Stakeholders?: Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1277
(2002).
65
Shawn Young, WorldCom, Its Shares Swooning, Renews Expired Poison-Pill Plan, WALL
ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1015800932650408240 (last updated Mar. 11, 2002, 12:01
AM).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
See Why Do Companies Care About Their Stock Prices?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.
investopedia.com/articles/basics/03/020703.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
69
See id.
70
Jennifer Mears, Companies Turn to 'Poison Pills', NETWORK WORLD, Mar. 18, 2002, at 64
[hereinafter Mears].
71
Id.
72
See The 10 Worst Corporate Accounting Scandals of All Time, supra note 5.
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The fact of the matter is that “poison pill[s] protect[] existing
management.”73 As noted earlier, WorldCom renewed its pill during the winter
of 2002.74 By the summer solstice, a massive accounting fraud was discovered
at the company. 75 Whereas the stock was trading at around $65 about two
years earlier, and about $10 three months earlier, by the summer it traded at 21
cents as a direct result of the uncovered fraud.76 The pill had the effect of
insulating management who were a direct threat to the company and by
extension, shareholder value.77
WorldCom’s CEO, Bernie Ebbers, was convicted for his role in the
corporate fraud. 78 WorldCom’s fraud was the biggest in the current wave,
which included those associated with companies such as Enron and Adelphia.79
The fraud consisted of an “accounting slight-of-hand,” whereby expenses for
capital maintenance were recorded as capital (asset) expenditures. 80 This
practice enabled WorldCom to manage industry reported cash flows and profits
by conveniently spreading costs over multiple reporting periods.81 While the
company enjoyed the benefits of the pill, i.e., protection from someone who
might offer a low price for a WorldCom that was extremely undervalued,
WorldCom leadership was busy utilizing accounting fraud practices which
inflated assets and profits by as much as $11 billion and $3.8 billion
respectively.82 It took only five quarters to accomplish this feat.83 More to the
point, it took five quarters to commit fraud resulting in 30,000 lost jobs and
$180 billion in investor losses.84 Ebbers was convicted for his role in the fraud
and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison, while having previously justified
using the poison pill to protect shareholders from someone shortchanging
them.85
Similarly, Countrywide was a huge subprime lender during the period


73

Mears, supra note 70 (alterations in original).
Young, supra note 65.
75
Massive Accounting Fraud Fells WorldCom, TIME (June 26, 2002), http://content.time.
com/time/business/article/0,8599,266287,00.html.
76
Id.
77
See id.
78
Krysten Crawford, Ebbers Gets 25 Years, CNN MONEY (Sept. 23, 2005, 7:42
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2005/07/13/news/newsmakers/ebbers_sentence/.
79
Id.
80
Massive Accounting Fraud Fells WorldCom, supra note 75.
81
Id.
82
The 10 Worst Corporate Accounting Scandals of All Time, supra note 5.
83
Massive Accounting Fraud Fells WorldCom, supra note 75.
84
The 10 Worst Corporate Accounting Scandals of All Time, supra note 5.
85
Massive Accounting Fraud Fells WorldCom, supra note 75.
74
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that led up to the recent economic downturn.86 Eager for profits, lenders like
Countrywide accommodated an increase in mortgage demand by taking risks
and creating ways to lend money to less than credit-worthy borrowers.87 These
borrowers were able to increase consumer spending by refinancing and pulling
equity out of over-priced properties.88
However, the market corrected itself and consumer spending decreased
because mortgage payment amounts increased faster than home values.89 The
effects hit cities, like Detroit, where auto sales decreased, unemployment
increased, and housing values decreased.90 Unemployed Detroit homeowners,
faced with rising mortgage payments on properties that were decreasing in
value, experienced foreclosure. 91 Today, this translates into blight. 92 The
corporation law regulatory regime facilitated the Detroit blight by enabling
companies like Countrywide to be shielded by poison pills and promulgate
lending policies that allowed consumers to qualify for mortgages that would
inevitably result in foreclosure.93 Countrywide had a poison pill in place as
late as 2008, when it was forced to allow a friendly acquisition by Bank of
America. 94 If the poison pill was not in place, an owner with a better
management team could have avoided the need to push the boundaries and
contribute to one of the worst recessions this country has experienced.95
Boards of directors at companies like WorldCom have the power to
refuse to relinquish control of underperforming companies.96 This power is
derived from poison pill legislation. Stakeholders should not be asked to act as
if target board of directors will not place their interests above the stakeholder
interests. Should we also believe that boards will not use company resources to
support politicians who vote for poison pill legislation? The analysis section
will examine why poison pill legislation should be repealed and replaced with


86

See BIANCO, supra note 5, at 8.
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Douglas Jamiel, Detroit's Dan Gilbert: Henry Ford or Henry Potter?, TRUTHOUT (Dec. 22,
2013, 9:40 AM), http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/20604-detroits-dan-gilbert-henry-ford-orhenry-potter.
93
BIANCO, supra note 5.
94
Bill Miller: Can’t Decide on Countrywide, CNN MONEY (Feb. 12, 2008, 2:06 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2008/02/12/markets/bill_miller/.
95
See Bianco, supra note 5, at 6–8. Some say that a rise in unregulated lenders who peddled
suprime loan products such as adjustable rate, interest-only, and “stated income” mortgages
contributed to the recent recession. Id.
96
Young, supra note 65.
87



12

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW

Vol. IX:I

statutes that ensure shareholder control over their share ownership rights
without having target board of directors make a decision about whether the
shareholders can have a vote and exercise those rights.
III. ANALYSIS
The hostile takeover regulatory regime has evolved to a point where
recent negative market results can be tied to it. In furthering the notion that
this regulatory regime should be repealed, the next section gets to the root of
the problem by highlighting the abundance of control target company board of
directors have and the ways they use it to help politicians, sympathetic to their
cause, entrench themselves. Additionally, this section provides the following
adequately robust solution: Repeal current anti-takeover statutes and replace
them with shareholder-friendly legislation that favors shareholders being able
to vote on whether to entertain bids for the company without having a board of
directors determine whether they should have this vote.
A. Poison Pills Provide Boards Too Much Control
Developments over the recent business cycle indicate that the hostile
takeover regulatory regime can facilitate significant economic downside results
because maneuvers such as poison pill deployment enable corporate boards to
neglect broad-based shareholder interests.97 Poison pills provide boards with
too much control. These pills allow boards to hold companies hostage and
command compensation packages in exchange for relinquishing corporate
control. Boards can also utilize company resources to lobby for favorable
legislation, at the expense of shareholder owners. Legislatures should adjust
statutory regimes to respect shareholders’ ownership rights to the extent that
they are allowed to sell their shares without having boards as gatekeepers.
Justification for poison pills is rooted in the need for corporations to have
independent boards.98 However, outside directors may be independent in form
but not so in fact.99 Outside directors often have personal ties to executives.100
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For instance, eleven of the fourteen Enron board members were (supposedly)
independent at the time of its scandal.101
Around the early 1990s, the Delaware pill102 evolved to allow boards to
refuse reasonably fair offers, i.e., they could “just say no.”103 Boards can adopt
poison pills relatively quickly, without shareholders’ approval, by a board
resolution within the few hours it takes to convene and hold a vote.104 As such,
every (Delaware) corporation has a latent shareholders’ rights plan/poison pill,
although it might not have surfaced at the time of a hostile bid.105
Target boards even went as far as to try and block shareholders’ ballot
box recourse by creating poison pill offshoots such as the “dead pan
provision,” which only allowed incumbent board members or their chosen
successors to redeem a poison pill. 106 The Delaware Chancery court
invalidated this provision, noting that it precluded proxy contests, which were
used by Raiders to elect a new board who would redeem the poison pill.107 In
Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, the slow hand pill, which was nonredeemable for six months, was also invalidated.108 Still, the hostile takeover
wars have succumb to the “impermeable” poison pill because proxy fights and
tender offers are inefficient in terms of the time it takes to replace opposing
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board members and the associated exorbitant costs.109
1. Executive Compensation
When the potential for significant personal benefit is high, hostile bids
incentivize management to use poison pills to bargain with.110 Raiders realized
that boards were holding target companies hostage, so they adjusted their
approach and sweetened the deal for directors by including an increase in
executive compensation in the package. 111 The increase in executive
compensation caused merger and acquisition (M&A) activity to grow stronger
because deals were friendlier with boards receiving a premium for
relinquishing control of their companies.112
Executive compensation evolved to convert the pill from a “just say no”
remedy to a negotiation primer for moving deals forward. 113 In effect,
executive compensation has sustained the market for corporate control. 114
Managers from companies with strong anti-takeover defenses tend to have
higher compensation.115 Extrapolated CEO pay reflects this phenomenon.116
In the early 1990s, CEOs of large companies in the United States made 140
times what corresponding workers made; whereas, by 2003 that number
increased to 500 times more than what corresponding workers made.117
Executive compensation works mainly because it aligns management’s
interest with those of the shareholders.118 However, in the corporate control
context, executive compensation can be excessive when it is used to reward
relinquishing control rather than incentivizing better performance. 119 Board
members can command excessive executive compensation to relinquish control
of a company despite the fact that these very board members are typically the
reason for the low stock prices that made their companies targets.120 Michael
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Ovitz 121 serves as an example for amounts companies can pay to transfer
control, as he received approximately $130 million despite serving only 25% of
his employment contract period and despite alleged disappointing
performance.122
2. Politicians as Fiduciaries
Boards also have too much control when it comes to their control of
company resources. Boards can utilize these resources to further their own
interests at the expense of shareholders. Courts in the United States have ruled
against poison pills; however, state legislatures have responded by sanctioning
them.123 The U.S. Constitution supports the notion that political power comes
from the people.124 The people grant political power to their elected agents to
govern over their interests and bind them legally. 125 These elected
representatives owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the principals126 who elected
them because this is where the power derived.127 However, this duty is not
normally “operationalized” in the form of being judicially enforceable.128
As in corporate law, the courts should enforce the politician’s fiduciary
duty of loyalty.129 This approach provides principals a remedy when agent
politicians engage in self-dealing. 130 It also promotes a better alignment
between the principal and agent’s interests.131
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The similarities between corporate and political governance are obvious.
Mainly, both are represented by principals who elect agents that can prefer
their own interests over those of the principal.132 To be sure, the agents from
each group make decisions that can bind the principals; whereas, these agents
do not necessarily have to follow the instructions of the majority of the
shareholders or voting public. 133 In fact, the agency problem is more
problematic when it comes to politics because, unlike corporations where a
shareholder can sell their shares, voters in political primaries lack ways for
exiting their agency relationship.134
Representatives are burdened with an interest in retaining the power that
comes with their elected positions, and this dynamic can present a conflict with
the interests of the general public. Where there is a potential conflict of
interest, the public should not trust agents to act in their interest. As such,
representatives should not be trusted to act in the interest of the people.135 An
example is where politicians vote to raise their own salaries.136 They cannot do
so without affecting the general public.137
More importantly, agents may utilize their control over lawmaking to
entrench themselves. 138 They may favor the interest of their constituent
corporate donors rather than the general public to stay rooted in their elected
positions.139 Boards can control corporate political donations, and they have
the ability to funnel money to representatives who pass legislation that can give
the boards power over corporate control decisions.140
Political lawmaking regarding poison pill legislation presents a conflict
of interest.141 Public opinion may diverge when it comes to favoring whether
politicians should represent the interest of their constituents versus those of the
general public.142 It is likely, however, that the consensus would not sanction
politicians acting mainly in their own interest.143
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B. Remedying the Problem: Reeling in the Power
As the problem exists in the legislation, the solution lies there as well.
Legislators can adjust poison pill legislation to protect shareholder ownership
rights by repealing anti-takeover statutes and replacing them with a regulatory
regime which guarantees shareholders’ right to vote on offers for their shares.
In their approach, legislators can eliminate board veto power, establishing a
shareholder approval safety valve. Boards would be able to vote under this
regime on attempts to acquire their companies; however, shareholders should
have the final say.
1. Statutory Regimes
Most states have statutory regimes that enable boards to utilize poison
pills that prevent unwanted bids. 144 Boards combine poison pills with
staggered boards145 to create powerful veto power.146 Eliminating board veto
power could provide a safe harbor against management conflicts of interest,
especially where there is a shareholder approval safety valve.147 Otherwise, the
absence of the disciplinary affect of shareholder review could allow managers
to shirk their responsibility. 148 Moreover, veto power enables managers to
perform poorly and retain corporate control or receive exorbitant compensation
on their way out.149 Importantly, veto power could provide boards the authority
to block offers that are beneficial to shareholders.150
The current regulatory regime implies mandated deference because
boards make the choice regarding whether a bid moves forward.151 This does
not mean that boards can obtain better results than shareholders themselves.152
Boards should be allowed to negotiate, just like attorneys who bargain for their
clients, provided that shareholders are able to make the final decision.
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Historical data supports this view. 153 For example, research indicates that
managers will sacrifice shareholder value in exchange for better treatment of
managers.154 Additionally, on average, shareholders experience a loss when
management defeats offers. 155 Protections from anti-takeover statutes cause
managerial slack 156 as well as poor operating performance. 157 In addition,
poison pills can add between 6% and 12% to the cost of an acquisition,158 and
this can be significant because the extra cost could drive away an offer that
shareholders would otherwise welcome.
2. Shareholder Voting
The main antitakeover prescription consists of a poison pill combined
with a staggered board.159 This “cocktail” does not allow shareholders to vote
on a board’s decisions to reject bids. 160 One commentator believes that
“[n]either the finance literature nor the norms of corporate law support vesting
such unbalanced power in the hands of the board.”161 The main inquiry should
be who is more likely to make better decisions – target boards and their related
consultants or the judiciary, the market, or shareholders.162
Economists recognize that the market typically includes in the model for
valuing a company, its future cash flows, and the propensity for management to
make investment decisions.163 Arguably, a lack of independence exists where
management judges its own capabilities. However, a “bilateral decision
structure,” which allows shareholders to vote on board takeover decisions,
synthesizes these two approaches because neither can unilaterally act on a
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bid.164 In fact, shareholder voting provides additional oversight for preventing
bad board decisions.165
One commentator argues that Delaware General Corporation Law section
166
141 promulgates that “the corporation’s business and affairs are ‘managed
by or under the direction of a board of directors.’"167 As such, boards typically
make corporate decisions, while shareholders have no right to initiate action;
rather, they are relegated to the role of reviewing few board actions.168
Still, shareholders have rights, including the right to vote and to sell their
shares. 169 Of these two rights, shareholders typically hold the right to sell
shares to be of more value.170 The right to sell shares should be protected just
as the right to vote is protected.171 Taken seriously, directors should not be
able to interfere with this right.172
Antitakeover statutes are fundamentally misguided and thus should be
repealed. 173 This legislation was based on a misguided premise; i.e., that
hostile takeovers are bad.174 Public opinion suggests that (hostile) takeovers
that resulted in companies selling off pieces destroyed jobs.175 However, the
business divisions were typically sold to new owners, and job losses were
attributable to the market. 176 On the other hand, these takeovers generated
huge returns, forcing companies to access unrealized value by improving
efficiencies.177 As such, legislators should reconsider these statutes and repeal
them.178
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IV. CONCLUSION
Poison pill legislation should be repealed. Politicians should enact
statutes which allow shareholders the right to vote on transferring the company
to a bidder regardless of board of director approval. The hostile takeover
regulatory regime has evolved. As the state of incorporation of most national
corporations, Delaware has filled the void where the federal government has
been reluctant to participate with legislation that affects key players in the
market for corporate control.179 Of these players, poison pills favor company
board of directors. 180 However, this favoritism is at the expense of the
shareholder’s fundamental right to sell their shares. The favoritism has also
allowed inept and fraudulent company leaders to negatively affect key
stakeholders, including the general public.181
In essence, poison pill legislation provides company boards too much
control; i.e., they can demand exorbitant compensation packages in exchange
for relinquishing corporate control 182 and use company assets to influence
politicians to enact favorable legislation. 183 Legislators owe shareholders a
duty of loyalty.184 In order to salvage shareholder’s right to entertain fair offers
and sell their shares, politicians should reconsider statutes authorizing poison
pills and repeal them. Politicians should simultaneously enact shareholderfriendly legislation, i.e., statutes which allow shareholders the right to vote and
entertain bids for their company even if the company board disagrees.
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